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Foreword
Gerhard Heinzmann and Giuseppina Ronzitti
Université Nancy 2, LPHS – Archives Poincaré
This volume focuses on constructivism, which is here intended as a
general philosophical attitude arising from reflection upon mathematics.
We are concerned with the ways in which this idea is applied in science
and with the theoretical reflections these applications give rise to. For
this purpose this volume presents different sides of the general idea of
constructivity, with the intention of getting a broader, and hopefully
insightful, understanding of questions such as ‘what is a construction’,
‘what constructs what’ and so on.
What interests us, then, is not so much the history of constructivism1
but the ideas behind it, and their possible applications.
We attempt to present the problem with recourse to an analogy. The
dichotomy constructive / non-constructive, in fact, resembles a little the
more general concrete / abstract distinction. Concerning mathematical
objects, the complication is that what we speak about are abstract (not
having a physical reality) objects, so that in our case what the distinction
amounts to is one between ‘abstract’ and ‘too abstract’ where the diffe-
rence is not just a question of emphasis. One might say that in such an
ethereal sphere as that of mathematics, to have a (abstract) construction
for an object is the only way to achieve some kind of concreteness, as far
as this is possible. As in the case of the concrete / abstract distinction,
Philosophia Scientiæ, Cahier spécial 6, 2006, 1–4.
1The interested reader may consult for example A. Troelstra, History of Construc-
tivism in the 20th Century, http://staff.science.uva.nl/anne/hhhist.pdf
2also in the case of the constructive / non-constructive dichotomy there
is no standard account of how the distinction is to be drawn. What is
needed is indeed an explanation or a description of what would make
for constructivity. As it turns out, many different answers are possible,
depending on the sense in which one thinks mathematical objects can
be built.
In the concrete / abstract dichotomy one thematizes the concept of
concrete (as we think we have a better understanding of it) and attempts
to define the abstract objects as those that lack typical features possessed
by concrete things, singling out, by way of negation, some criteria for
abstractness (e.g., non-spatiality, causal inefficacy). In the constructive /
non-constructive dichotomy one thematizes instead the concept of non-
constructive, for, with a little exaggeration, that might be said to be the
default position in modern mathematics, and thus a fortiori what is taken
to be better understood. The situation is then specular, and one says
that constructive objects as those possessing certain features that non-
constructive objects lack. For example one might say that constructive
objects are those possessing a computational content. This is the way the
mathematicians of Bishop’s school understand the word ‘constructive’.
While it is easy to see why computable mathematical entities (those
given, for example, by means of an algorithm) can be accepted as con-
structive, in other approaches to see the idea which lies behind ‘being a
constructive object’ is more elaborate. L.E.J. Brouwer (1881-1966), the
initiator of intuitionism, for example accepted as mathematical objects
non-algorithmic infinite sequences of natural numbers which are incom-
plete and which cannot be completed. These are Brouwer’s infinitely
proceeding sequences (choice sequences), the conceptual building blocks
of the intuitionistic theory of the continuum. The idea which motivates
the possibility of considering such entities as constructive is that compu-
tations involving infinitely proceeding sequences only use a finite amount
of information, namely an initial segment of the infinite sequences.
While there is substantial disagreement among the constructivists on
what counts as a constructive object, there is substantial accord on what
counts as the logic of constructive mathematics: intuitionistic logic. In
the words of Douglas Bridges, this is the logic that is “forced upon us
when we want to work constructively”.2 The supporting reason is that the
intuitionistic interpretation of connectives and quantifiers would reflect
the meaning they have in mathematical constructive proofs.
2Constructive Mathematics: A Foundation for Computable Analysis, in Theoreti-
cal Computer Science, 219 (1999), 95-109.
3The constructive / non-constructive distinction matters in philoso-
phy, because both constructive and non-constructive objects and reaso-
nings appear to present certain general problems in epistemology and
in the philosophy of mathematics. For example, according to construc-
tivists, it is impossible to have genuine knowledge of non-constructive
objects. The problem for constructivists is then to show that non-cons-
tructive objects are especially problematic and to offer a viable alternati-
ve. More pointedly, from a philosophical point of view the constructivist
ideally must show that it is possible to do mathematics without non-
constructive assumptions or at least show how far one can go construc-
tively. Another related question is that of the relation between construc-
tive mathematics and science. Classical mathematics, at least some parts
of it, is successfully applied in science, so that the non-constructivist can
claim that science requires and at the same time justifies classical ma-
thematics.3 While this does not imply that constructive mathematics
has no application in science, the constructivist is asked to react in some
way, either by saying that being applicable is not the main concern of
mathematics or by showing how constructive theories indeed relate to
science.4
The Contributions in this Volume
In the first article Constructing Ordinals Herman Ruge Jervell presents
his own way of representing ordinals by finite trees, and thus building up
the Veblen hierarchy. Towards the end of the paper the author mentions
the difficulty of extending his ideas further in a constructive way.
The second paper Brouwer’s Real Thesis on Bars by Wim Veldman,
a piece in traditional intuitionistic mathematics, focuses on the intuitio-
nistic Bar theorem presenting a possible formulation of Brouwer’s Thesis
on Bars. The formulation uses the formalism of Kleene-Vesley. The last
section deals with some examples of the applications of Brouwer’s thesis
on bars in intuitionistic analysis.
3This is the so-called Quine-Putnam indispensability argument.
4For the case of the semi-constructive predicative mathematics one such example
is given by Feferman’s system W of variable finite types that seems to be sufficient for
all mathematics necessary for doing science and can be proved theoretically reducible
to first order Peano arithmetic. See S. Feferman, Why a Little Bit Goes a Long
Way: Logical Foundations of Scientifically Applicable Mathematics, PSA 1992 Vol. 2
(1993). Reprinted with minor corrections and additions in S. Feferman, In the Light
of Logic, Oxford University Press, 1998, 284ff.
4The third paper Reverse Mathematics in Bishop’s Constructive Ma-
thematics by Hajime Hishihara begins with a vivid description of con-
structive reverse mathematics, which consists in classifying theorems in
analysis in terms of their degree of constructivity. The connections and
differences of this discipline to classical reverse mathematics are shown.
The main part of the article consist in a comprehensive survey of results.
In Section 5, the notion of representability for pointwise continuous func-
tions is introduced.
In the fourth article, Equality in the Presence of Apartness: An Appli-
cation of Structural Proof Analysis to Intuitionistic Axiomatics, Bianca
Boretti and Sara Negri present, through contraction- and cut-free se-
quent calculi, the theories of apartness, equality, and n-stable equality.
By methods of proof analysis they obtain a purely proof-theoretic cha-
racterization of the equality fragment of apartness.
The article At the Heart of Analysis: Intuitionism and Philosophy by
David McCarty is concerned with contrasting various forms of intuitioni-
stic mathematics with the classical, and argues that intuitionism is first
and foremost mathematics, and only subsequently involves a philosophi-
cal stance.
Colin McLarty’s articleTwo Constructivist Aspects of Category Theo-
ry is about the (unexpected) links of category theory to constructivism,
namely the closeness of topos logic to intuitionistic logic, and the fact
that much of general category theory is somehow constructive.
The last article, Type Theory and Universal Grammar by Aarne Ran-
ta, takes a look at the history of the idea of universal grammar and com-
pares it with multilingual grammars, as formalized in the Grammatical
Framework, GF, previously introduced by Ranta.5 The constructivist
idea of formalizing mathematics piece by piece, in a weak logical fra-
mework, rather than trying to reduce everything to one single strong
theory, is the model that guides the development of grammars in GF.
5Dialogue Systems as Proof Editors, Journal of Logic, Language and Information
13 (2004), 225-240.
